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The Effect of Superstar Software on Hardware Sales in 
System Markets 
 
Abstract 
Systems are composed of complementary products (e.g., video game systems are composed of 
the video game console and video games). Prior literature on indirect network effects argues that, 
in system markets, sales of the primary product (often referred to as “hardware”) largely depend 
on the availability of complementary products (often referred to as “software”). Mathematical and 
empirical analyses have almost exclusively operationalized software availability as software 
quantity. However, while not substantiated with empirical evidence, case illustrations show that 
certain “superstar” software titles of very high quality (e.g., Super Mario 64) may have had 
disproportionately large effects on hardware unit sales (e.g., Nintendo N64 console sales). In the 
context of the U.S. home video game console market, we show that the introduction of a superstar 
increases video game console sales on average by 14%, over a period of 5 months. Software type 
does not consistently alter this effect. Our findings imply that scholars who study the relationship 
between software availability and hardware sales, need to account for superstar returns, and their 
decaying effect over time, over and above a mere software quantity effect. Hardware firms should 
maintain a steady flow of superstar introductions, as the positive effect of a superstar only lasts 
for 5 months, and make, if need be, side-payments to software firms, as superstars dramatically 
increase hardware sales. Obtaining exclusivity over superstars, by hardware firms, does not 
provide an extra boost to their own sales, but it does take away an opportunity for competing 
systems to increase their sales. 
 
Keywords: System markets, superstars, indirect network effects, new product introductions, 
software, hardware, video game industry. 
Introduction 
“You can have the best technology, the most advanced box in the world. But without the 
applications, that box will only collect dust on the retail shelves.” - Kazuo Hirai, president of 
Sony Computer Entertainment of America (Huffstutter 1999) 
 
 
Systems are composed of complementary and interdependent products, such as hardware 
and software (Farrell and Saloner 1986; Katz and Shapiro 1986a; Stremersch et al. 2003; Wuyts 
et al. 2004). For instance, video game systems are composed of the video game console, on the 
one hand, and video games, on the other hand (Chou and Shy 1990; Clements and Ohashi 2005; 
Gandal, Kende and Rob 2000). Other examples are plenty. The Compact Disk consists of CD 
Players and CD’s. Television consists of TV sets and TV programming. Research in economics 
and marketing has argued that in such system markets, hardware sales depend mainly on the 
available software (Farrell and Saloner 1986; Gupta, Jain and Sawhney 1999; Katz and Shapiro 
1986a and 1994). To avoid any misunderstanding, we should immediately stress that software 
availability in this theory never refers to software sales (= demand), but rather refers to the 
catalog of software titles that is available for a particular hardware (= supply). 
The major importance of software in system markets has made it into the prime concern 
for hardware firms (i.e., system owners). For instance, in the video game console industry, 
system owners spend a fortune on software development to guarantee a sufficient supply of 
software, either through internal development, or through subsidizing independent software 
developers (Coughlan 2004). Microsoft put $375 million in cash on the table to acquire just one 
software development studio (Kent 2002). Sony alone has 14 of these software development 
studios (GamePro 2006). Sony shipped over 10,000 Playstation 3 development kits, to software 
developers, before selling even one Playstation 3 (Guardian 2006), to secure the supply of 
attractive software titles. 
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The main shortcoming of the academic literature on this phenomenon is that mathematical 
and empirical analyses have almost exclusively focused on a single dimension of software 
availability, namely software quantity1, i.e., the number of software titles introduced (for an 
overview, Stremersch et al. 2007). While not substantiated with empirical evidence, case 
illustrations raise that certain individual software titles may have had disproportionately large 
effects on hardware sales (Allen 2003; Dickson 2008; Frels, Shervani and Srivastava 2003; 
Gilroy 1994; Rowe 1999; Shapiro and Varian 1998; Williams 2002). We call these individual 
software titles of exceptional high quality “superstars”2. Prior literature has studied superstars in 
the music industry (Chung and Cox 1994), major league baseball (MacDonald and Reynolds 
1994), and the movie industry (Collins, Hand and Snell 2002). However, the returns software 
superstars may have on hardware sales in system markets remains unexamined. This lack of 
academic inquiry does not match the importance of the role such software titles may play in 
system markets. The present study aims to fill that void.  
We examine to what extent superstars may increase hardware unit sales, in the context of 
the U.S. home video game console industry. We find that the introduction of a superstar software 
title significantly increases hardware unit sales, with on average 14% (167,000 units), over and 
above the effects of other hardware and software attributes. This positive effect persists only for 
the first 5 months after their introduction. Software type does not substantially alter this effect. 
Therefore, the traditional operationalization of software quantity (i.e., the number of software 
titles introduced) may be limited, as it overlooks both superstar power, and potential time decays. 
                                                 
1 Prior literature also refers to software quantity as software availability or software variety. 
2 There exists considerable confusion between terms such as superstars, and terms such as blockbusters, hits, killer 
applications, or more specifically in the case of the video game industry, killer games, or triple A games. Our focus 
is on software titles of exceptional quality, which yields a disproportionate pay-off, a concept most akin to the 
“superstar” concept, as originally introduced by Rosen (1981). We therefore will consistently use the term 
“superstars” throughout this paper. Concepts such as “hits” or “blockbusters” often refer to software titles with a 
high sales volume, rather than high quality. The term “killer applications” refers to specific games that allowed one 
system to “kill” or dominate another.  
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We also find that superstars display increasing returns (i.e., hardware unit sales) to software 
quality.   
We gather data on 11 home video game consoles in the U.S., between January 1993 and 
December 2004. The video game console industry is an appropriate context, as it is a system 
market, in which software (i.e., video games) is thought to be crucial to promote hardware (i.e., 
video game console) sales (Clements and Ohashi 2005; Williams 2002). 
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. The next section develops the theory 
on superstar introductions and other determinants of hardware sales. The third section discusses 
the video game console industry, and presents the sample, data collection, and the measurement 
of the variables. The fourth section presents the model. The fifth section presents the results, and 
further analyses we conducted. The sixth section presents the discussion of the results, their 
implications, and the limitations of the paper. 
Superstar Introductions and Other Determinants of Hardware 
Sales 
This section first explains the concept of software superstars and discusses how their 
introduction may affect hardware unit sales. Second, it argues how this relationship may be 
dependent upon software type. Third, it adds other variables that may also affect hardware unit 
sales, for which we need to control in our empirical testing. We will tailor the theory 
development to our empirical context, the U.S. home video game console market, for clarity of 
exposition. However, the theory we develop is also applicable in many other system markets, 
such as the DVD market (e.g. the effect of superstar introductions, such as The Matrix, on DVD 
sales) or the Satellite radio market (e.g. the effect of radio superstars joining a Satellite radio 
network, such as Howard Stern, on Satellite radio sales). 
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Superstars  
Superstars possess unique and superior attributes or skills that command a 
disproportionately large payoff (Rosen 1981). In a superstar industry, a small number of high-
quality superstars, demand disproportionately large compensation packages, and dominate their 
respective industry (Rosen 1981). A superstar industry displays increasing returns to quality, due 
to the scarcity of high quality (Mayer 1960; Rosen 1981). There is a monotonic increasing returns 
relationship between quality and the payoff. Or as Cox and Kleiman (2000) put it “If a golfer, is 
on average, but one stroke better than other competitors then a disproportionate number of 
tournament championships would be won by said athlete.” It is very hard for competing golfers 
to copy Tiger Woods’ skills. Similarly, competitors will find it hard to copy the quality 
characteristics of other superstars, such as The Beatles, Star Wars or Super Mario Brothers, 
especially after they have introduced their products on the market, as often the quality is 
unknown until the product is in the hands of the consumer.  
Illustrations of superstar industries are plenty. Chung and Cox (1994) find a high 
concentration of output among top music performers, the top 10.8% of gold record receivers 
collected 43.1% of all gold records during the period 1958 to 1989. De Vany and Walls (1996) 
report that just 20% of the films earned 80% of box office revenues. Exploratory research by 
Liebowitz and Margolis (1999) suggests that the highest quality software titles conquer a 
disproportionately large part of the total software market. 
The video game industry is also a superstar industry. Figure 1 categorizes video game 
quality for the Sony Playstation in 20 quality categories from [0-5] to [95-100] (we discuss the 
operationalization of video game quality in the data section). The columns in Figure 1 represent 
the number of video games in each quality category. The line with diamonds represents the 
average unit sales of a video game in each quality category. The first conclusion we can draw, is 
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that this market shows a disproportionate response of software sales to software quality, and that 
there is a monotonic increasing returns relationship between software quality and software unit 
sales. The second conclusion is that the frequency distribution of quality follows a bell-shaped 
curve, with a negative skewness, indicating scarcity of high quality products, which results in the 
increasing returns to quality (e.g., Mayer 1960; Rosen 1981). Both of these conclusions imply 
that the video game industry is indeed a superstar industry, showing disproportionate returns to 
quality, with a small number of high quality games that are very popular. Other systems depict 
similar patterns. Using software dollar sales instead of software unit sales, does not alter this 
picture. Recent examples of superstar video games are ‘Grand Theft Auto: Vice City’ and ‘Halo 
2’, which both sold over 4 million copies in the U.S. alone, within the first three months after 
introduction. 
In system markets, high quality software titles are likely to have a positive effect on 
hardware unit sales (Frels, Shervani and Srivastava 2003). Superstar software titles are so 
desirable, that they can easily trigger the adoption of the system by consumers. Williams (2002) 
argues that superstar video games entice consumers to spend several hundred dollars to buy the 
video game console and accessories required, to play those highly desirable video games. Shapiro 
and Varian (1998) believe that Walt Disney’s Wonderful World of Color was the prime reason 
why consumers invested in color television sets. The spreadsheet (e.g., VisiCalc, Lotus 1-2-3, 
Excel) and the word processor (e.g., WordStar, WordPerfect, Word) are credited for selling 
millions of Personal Computers (Frels, Shervani and Srivastava 2003; Gilroy 1994). Business 
press has claimed that the video game Tetris has been a major driving force behind the success of 
the original Nintendo Gameboy (Allen 2003; Rowe 1999). Therefore, we expect the introduction 
of a superstar software title to increase hardware unit sales in system markets.  
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Moreover, if superstars display increasing returns from software quality to software unit 
sales, then we may expect superstars in system markets, to display increasing returns from 
software quality to hardware unit sales (e.g., Liebowitz and Margolis 1999; Mayer 1960; Rosen 
1981).   
Software Life Cycle  
In many system markets, software titles only have a limited life expectancy, due to 
continuous innovation and changing consumer tastes, thereby limiting the sales potential of 
software titles to only a short period after their introduction. Sales of a software title peak during 
or soon after introduction, and subsequently decline. This sales pattern is observed across many, 
similar markets: CD’s, DVD’s, LP’s, PC software applications, television and radio broadcasts, 
and video cassettes (e.g., Ainslie, Drèze and Zufryden 2005; Krider and Weinberg 1998; Luan 
and Sudhir 2007).  
Video games also have a short life expectancy, approximately 3 months, but this life cycle 
can stretch to 12 months for very successful video games (Gaume 2006). Figure 2 depicts the 
evolution of software unit sales of superstar and non-superstar software titles, from the month of 
introduction at t, and later. The software unit sales of superstars also peak during introduction 
(291,000 units) and subsequently decline. Superstars achieve software unit sales of around 1.3 
million units on average, while non-superstar software titles achieve unit sales of just 187,000 
units. Software unit sales of superstars turn flat after 6 months, and subsequently the sales 
evolution of superstars and non-superstars depicts a similar pattern, of slow declining sales over 
time.  
Because of the limited life expectancy of software, we expect the introduction of a 
superstar software title to positively affect hardware unit sales, during the month of introduction 
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and a limited number of months after introduction. In addition, we expect that this effect, will 
peak during the month of introduction, and subsequently decline. 
Software Type 
Software type may influence the effects we posited above. While one can typify video 
games along multiple dimensions, three are particularly salient and relevant, as they are often 
used in the video game industry to describe the differences between individual video games 
(Clements and Ohashi 2005; Venkatraman and Lee 2004; Williams 2002). Other software 
markets, like movies and music use similar software types. 
The first dimension is whether a superstar software title is exclusively available for only 
one system, or is available for multiple systems. Prior literature suggests that exclusivity of 
software (i.e., content) is a valuable commodity in system markets, because it creates a 
competitive advantage (Shapiro 1999). System owners often pay software publishers top dollar 
for the exclusive availability of their attractive software. Sony paid a sum in the tens of millions 
of dollars to software publisher Take-Two to make the superstar franchise ‘Gran Theft Auto’ 
exclusive to the Playstation 2 (IGN 2002). Toshiba (the system owner of the HD-DVD standard) 
paid Paramount and DreamWorks Animation $150 million in incentives for their exclusive 
commitment to HD-DVD, and dropping their support for Sony’s competing Blu-ray standard 
(Barnes 2007). Sony allegedly paid Warner Brothers $400 in incentives to drop Toshiba’s 
standards (Edwards and Grover 2008). System owners (e.g., Microsoft) want exclusive content 
(e.g., Halo 3) because it (supposedly) increases hardware sales (e.g., video game console sales) 
(Gibson 2007). If a superstar software title is introduced on multiple systems, the resulting new 
hardware adopters are dispersed across multiple systems. If the introduction of a superstar title is 
exclusively for just one system, the new hardware adopters will all adopt the same system. 
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Following this line of thought, exclusive superstar software titles could prove to be a crucial 
factor in positive feedback markets, because of their ability to tip the market outcome towards 
one specific system, during a systems war (i.e., standards war) (e.g., Arthur 1989 and 1996; 
Shapiro and Varian 1998). We therefore expect exclusive superstar software titles to have a larger 
effect on hardware unit sales of the system in question, compared to non-exclusive superstar 
software titles.  
The second dimension is whether the software title is a sequel to a prequel for the same 
system. Research on movies has shown that sequels have an already established brand name, and 
a higher awareness among consumers, and therefore have higher sales than the prequel (Ainslie, 
Drèze and Zufryden 2005; Basuroy, Desai and Talukdar 2006; Sawhney and Eliashberg 1996). 
As consumers are more aware about superstar sequels compared to original superstars (i.e., non-
sequel superstars) and sequels have a proven record, one may expect the introduction of superstar 
sequels to have a larger effect on hardware unit sales, compared to the introduction of original 
superstars. On the other hand, consumers who buy the superstar sequel are likely to have already 
bought the prequel, which means that they already own the hardware. Also, original superstars 
are introduced earlier in the life cycle of the system, meaning that the hardware installed base is 
smaller, leaving more potential hardware adopters available. In addition, a recent study of Luan 
and Sudhir (2007) finds that sequels in the DVD market perform worse than non-sequels. 
According to this reasoning, superstar sequels may have a smaller impact on hardware unit sales, 
compared to original superstars. Because of these contradictory arguments, the direction of the 
effect is an interesting, empirical matter.  
The third dimension is the genre to which the superstar software title belongs. The video 
game market consists of six different genres. There are two large genres (action and platformer), 
and four small – niche – genres (first-person shooter (FPS), racing, role playing (RPG), sports). 
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Software titles from the large genres appeal to a very broad range of gamers, from hardcore 
gamers to casual gamers. The small genres serve a smaller more specialized niche market. The 
introduction of software in popular genres helps hardware sales grow more rapidly (Basu, 
Mazumdar and Raj 2003). We therefore expect the introduction of superstars from the large 
genres to have a larger impact on hardware unit sales, compared to the introduction of superstars 
from the small genres. 
Other Variables 
We next discuss other variables that may also affect hardware unit sales. We carefully 
identified which variables are key in determining the attractiveness of the hardware and software 
of a system by examining the prior literature (e.g. Basu, Mazumdar and Raj 2003; Brynjolfsson 
and Kemerer 1996; Clements and Ohashi 2005; Gandal 1994; Gandal, Kende and Rob 2000; 
Nair, Chintagunta and Dubé 2004; Shankar and Bayus 2003; Shy 2001; Stremersch et al. 2007). 
We control for these variables in our empirical testing. 
Variables we include, relating to the attractiveness of the software side of the system, are 
software catalog (i.e., all software introduced up to and including t-1) and software introductions 
(in t); we expect both to positively affect hardware unit sales (e.g., Basu, Mazumdar and Raj 
2003; Clements and Ohashi 2005; Gandal, Kende and Rob 2000; Nair, Chintagunta and Dubé 
2004). An increase in the catalog of past software introductions increases the utility a consumer 
may derive from the system. In addition, a larger number of present software introductions may 
also increase the utility a consumer derives.  The latter effect may be greater than the former as 
entertainment products typically have short life cycles (Luan and Sudhir 2007; Williams 2002); 
also video games typically have short life cycles. We expect software quality (the average quality 
of all video games available to consumers) to positively affect hardware unit sales. While prior 
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literature has not examined the effect of the overall quality of the software available on hardware 
unit sales, there are several reasons to expect higher catalog quality to translate into higher 
hardware unit sales. One reason is that higher average quality of the software catalog reflects 
positively on the perceived quality of the system. Another reason may be that a high quality 
catalog increases the probability that consumers have positive experiences with the console prior 
to buying it, e.g. when playing at a friend’s house, or when trying it out in the store. We expect 
software price, to negatively influence hardware unit sales, but we expect the effect size to be 
small (prices show relatively little variance in this industry). The reason is that as the price of 
software decreases, the attractiveness of the hardware increases.  
Variables we include, relating to the attractiveness of the hardware side of the system, are 
hardware price, which we expect to negatively affect hardware unit sales, but we expect the 
effect size to be small in our application (prices show relatively little variance in this industry). 
As the price of hardware decreases, consumers become more inclined to adopt the system (e.g. 
Clements and Ohashi 2005; Shankar and Bayus 2003). We also included hardware age, which 
we expect to negatively affect hardware unit sales. The hardware becomes less attractive as it 
ages, because it becomes less “cutting-edge”. Hardware age can also be interpreted as the time 
trend in the hardware unit sales series, which is common in this area (e.g. Basu, Mazumdar and 
Raj 2003; Brynjolfsson and Kemerer 1996; Gandal 1994; Shy 2001; Stremersch et al. 2007). 
We also include a December dummy, which controls for the December holiday effect, due 
to the holiday buying spree that typically drives consumer electronic markets (i.e., the video 
game market). We expect the sign of the December dummy parameter to be positive (Christmas 
and New Year shopping). 
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Data 
This section first discusses the video game industry and the sample. Next, it presents the 
data collection procedures, and it ends with providing the measures for our variables.  
Video Game Industry 
Playing video games isn’t child’s play anymore. American households rate playing video 
games as the most fun entertainment activity, beating watching television, surfing the Internet, 
reading books and going to, and renting, movies (IDSA 2001). Many young gamers spend more 
time playing games than watching TV (Bloom 1982; Funk and Buchman 1996). The average 
game player is 33 years old, has been playing games for 12 years, and plays games for over 7 
hours per week (ESA 2007). The video game industry has become a mature industry, dominated 
by mainstream content (Williams 2002). The business of publishing video games is highly 
similar to that of other software markets like CD’s, (e)books, DVD’s, radio shows, videocassettes 
and television shows (e.g., Greco 2000; Komiya and Litman 1990; Williams 2002). 
In 2007, sales of PC and video games, video game consoles, and video game accessories 
exceeded $18.8 billion dollars in the U.S. alone (NPD 2008). During our sample period, video 
game software sales increased from $1.8 billion in 1993 to $5.4 billion in 2004, a 200% increase, 
while video game hardware sales increased from $1.0 billion in 1993 to $1.6 billion in 2004, a 
65% increase. Game sales in the PC market also show an increase, from $0.5 billion in 1995 to 
$1.1 billion in 2004, a 137% increase, while PC hardware sales increased from $8.2 in 1993 to 
$17.2 billion, a 110% increase. Figure 3 depicts the evolution of PC and video game sales over 
time. The dotted line with triangles depicts video game sales, the dashed line with circles depicts 
PC game sales, and the dashed line with triangles depicts console hardware sales; all depicted 
against the left y-axis. The solid line with squares depicts PC hardware sales and uses the right y-
axis. Figure 4 decomposes video game sales and PC game sales according to the six game genres. 
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During our sample period, consumers bought over 127 million video game consoles and 
over 1 billion software titles. Thus, on average a hardware adopter buys more than 8 software 
titles. For every hardware unit sold, for which consumers pay around $152, consumers spend 
around $287 on software, spread out over the entire life cycle of the hardware. Thus, consumers 
spend 65% of their allocation on software, and only 35% on hardware. This clearly indicates the 
importance of software in this system market. This is similar to other system markets, like CD-
player and CD’s or DVD-player and DVD’s, where buyers also spend most of their money on 
software (e.g., Bayus 1987).  
Sample 
The data covers 11 home video game consoles (e.g., 3DO Multiplayer, Atari Jaguar, 
Microsoft Xbox, Nintendo 64, Nintendo GameCube, Nintendo Super NES, Sega Dreamcast, 
Sega Genesis, Sega Saturn, Sony Playstation, and Sony Playstation 2), in the U.S. home video 
game industry during the period January 1993 to December 2004 (144 consecutive months). The 
data cover the entire population of home video game consoles available to U.S. consumers during 
this period. The data also cover all information we require on the software for these 11 systems, 
which comprises around 5,800 software titles.  
The monthly hardware unit sales range between 3 units and almost 2.7 million units. 
However, about a third of these monthly observations, contain very few hardware unit sales. 195 
observations contain hardware unit sales of less than 5,000 units, because hardware unit sales 
very slowly dry up, after consumers and software publishers have abandoned the system. 
Nintendo sold more than 16 million units of its SNES console in the U.S., but during the last 36 
months, less than 2,500 units were sold, and no new software was introduced. Thus, there are two 
regimes, the ‘life’ regime (i.e., when typically substantial sales occur), and the ‘death’ regime 
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(i.e., when very few sales occur). As we are only interested in the ‘life’ regime, we will eliminate 
the data observations of the ‘death’ regime, because using one model across these two regimes is 
likely to create biases.  
Therefore, we remove all monthly observations at the end of a system’s life, after which 
either consumers, or software publishers, have abandoned the system. We assume the system to 
be abandoned, if software providers do not introduce any software titles for the next three 
months, or if hardware unit sales drop below 5,000 units. Using these two cutoffs, leaves us with 
513 observations (see Table 1).3 The number of observations reduces by 32%, but the total 
amount of hardware units sold decreases by less than 4%, to 120 million units.  
Data Collection 
The data originated from two databases, which we subsequently integrated. NPD 
provided retail hardware unit sales, hardware price, software unit sales, software price and 
software introductions. NPD is a market research firm that covers the video game industry and 
their data has been previously used by other researchers (e.g. Clements and Ohashi 2005; 
Shankar and Bayus 2003; Stremersch et al. 2007; Venkatraman and Lee 2004).  
We collected information on video game quality ratings and software type for all 5,800 
video games in our data set by hand. Gathering these data was a long, labor-intensive process. 
We used leading U.S. video game magazines, and websites, like Electronic Gaming Monthly 
(EGM), Gamespot, and the Imagine Games Network (IGN), to obtain expert quality ratings of 
video games. Prior research has also used magazine expert ratings, as an indicator for product 
quality (e.g. Archibald, Haulman and Moody 1983; Conlon, Devaraj and Matta 2001; Liebowitz 
and Margolis 1999).   
                                                 
3 Tests indicate that at our cutoff point (i.e., breakpoint) of the dependent variable, a large negative structural change 
(i.e., regime switch) is present (-0.797; P<0.01). The findings in this paper are robust to selecting somewhat stricter, 
or more lenient, cutoffs. 
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Besides collecting expert ratings, we also collected consumer quality ratings of video 
games, through these publications. In total, we collected over 132,000 expert ratings, and over 
3.8 million user ratings. To obtain the quality of an individual video game, we average these 
ratings, giving the same weight to the overall expert rating as to the overall user rating.4  
Measures 
We will now briefly discuss our measures, all of which are at a monthly periodicity for 
the system of interest. We start with the variables at the hardware side. Hardware unit sales are 
the monthly number of video game consoles sold for the system of interest. Hardware price for a 
video game console is the price of the bare bone version of the video game console in that month. 
Hardware age (i.e., the time trend) of a video game console is equal to the number of months the 
hardware has been on the market. 
At the software side, we first discuss the operationalization of our focal construct, the 
introduction of superstars.5 As stated above, superstars are characterized by their high quality 
(Frels, Shervani and Srivastava 2003; Rosen 1981). Therefore, we have developed a heuristic. To 
                                                 
4 We follow this procedure, as it enhances the quality of the data, by increasing the accuracy through averaging 
individual-level errors and biases that are random (Rousseau 1985). It also fits the behavior of consumers as they 
often combine multiple separate pieces of information into an overall evaluation by averaging them (Anderson 1996; 
Kahn and Ross 1993). From our data, we also learn that experts have tastes similar to users (inter-rater reliability = 
.652; n=5,650). This correlation is somewhat depressed, because a large number of software titles are of low quality 
and achieve only very low sales, for which there are only a few expert and user ratings available. Eliminating these 
video games and their ratings greatly increases the inter-rater reliability between expert and user ratings. The inter-
rater agreement for video games for which there are at least 5 expert and at least 5 user ratings available is .828 
(n=3,748). The conclusion is that experts do not seem to systematically rate video games differently from users. This 
is because experts, have been, and are, themselves active gamers. In addition, by publishing the quality rating of 
videogames, experts and users are open to public scrutiny by other experts and users, and this will help to minimize 
biases (Kane 1981). 
5 We use superstar introduction and not superstar software sales, to model the effect of superstars on hardware unit 
sales, for a number of reasons. First, in the analytical literature, the introduction of a single software title by a 
software firm has a positive effect on the utility of the hardware, thereby increasing hardware sales (Church and 
Gandal 1992; Katz and Shapiro 1986b). Given this literature, there is no reason to assume that superstar software 
sales should affect the hardware utility. Second, the introduction of software titles especially superstar titles, are a 
clear signal of software developer support, whereas superstar sales are not. Third, the strong presence of seasonality 
in the video game industry, as in many other software markets, makes the use of sales less desirable. Fourth, using 
superstar software sales instead of superstar introductions would make this variable highly endogenous, due to its 
dependence on hardware unit sales. 
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be called a superstar software title, a software title must have a quality rating of 90 or above. A 
quality threshold of 90 identifies only the very best software titles as superstars. This threshold 
identifies 89 games out of approximately 5,800 software titles as superstars. Typically, these 
software titles sell over 1 million copies. Software unit sales of 1 million is considered to be an 
important threshold in the video game industry (Cadin and Guerin 2006; Pereira 2002). This 
threshold is also the point at which increasing returns to quality kick in. We list all 89 superstars, 
per system, in Table 2. Representatives of the NPD video game division perceived our heuristic 
and our list of superstars as valid. The findings in this paper are robust across a wide range of 
thresholds (see the results section). 
We operationalize the other software variables as follows. Software catalog is the size of 
the available software catalog, which is equal to the number of video games available to 
consumers and sold at least once, prior to the month of interest for the system of interest. 
Software introductions refers to the number of video games introduced in the month of interest 
for the system of interest (e.g. Basu, Mazumdar and Raj 2003; Clements and Ohashi 2005; 
Gandal, Kende and Rob 2000; Nair, Chintagunta and Dubé 2004). Software price is the average 
price of all the software titles available in the software catalog for the system in the month of 
interest. Software quality is the average quality of all software titles available in the software 
catalog for the system in the relevant month.  
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables of interest. 
Model 
To capture the influence of our explanatory variables on hardware unit sales, we specify a 
dynamic panel data model, taking the log transform of specific effects when appropriate, given 
prior literature (e.g., Basu, Mazumdar and Raj 2003; Cottrell and Koput 1998; Dranove and 
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Gandal 2003; Gandal 1995; Gandal, Kende and Rob 2000; Stremersch et al. 2007). The log-
transform functional form of the model is appropriate given the needs to pool data across video 
game consoles that represent different sales volumes. The dependent variable is the log-transform 
of hardware unit sales of console i in month t, denoted as SitH . 
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μi is a fixed effect that captures heterogeneity across the different consoles i and controls 
for time-invariant, unobserved, console-specific variables. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian 
multiplier test for random effects rejects a random effects model, in favor of a fixed effects 
model. Also conceptually, a fixed effects model is more appropriate than a random effects model, 
as the selection of systems from the population is not random. Next, we include the price of video 
game console i in month t (denoted as PitH ), and the age of video game console i in month t 
(denoted as AitH ). These independent variables model the hardware attractiveness of the system. 
At the software side, we include software price of video game console i in month t 
(denoted as PitS
1
CAT
itS −
), software catalog of past software introductions of video game console i in 
month t-1 ( ), present software introductions of video game console i in month t ( INTitS ), and 
software quality of video game console i in month t ( ). We do not take the log of software 
quality, because we model software quality as increasing returns to quality, as suggested by 
QL
itS
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superstar theory, and as modeled by prior empirical superstar literature (e.g. Jones and Walsh 
1988). Next,  denotes the number of superstar software titles introduced in month t for 
console i (0 if no superstar was introduced, 1 if a superstar was introduced, 2 if two superstars 
were introduced, etc.). To examine the persistence of the effect superstars have on hardware unit 
sales over time, we also add lagged terms of this variable. We do not impose a structure on 
this effect, because we do not know if there is an effect, how long this effect lasts, or the shape of 
this effect over time (e.g., decaying, linear, inverted U-shape). This method is widely used in 
marketing (e.g., see Mitra and Golder 2006). These independent variables model the software 
attractiveness of the system. Finally, the model also includes a dummy variable for the December 
holiday effect (
SS
itS
N
DEC
tC ).  
Estimating this model with OLS is not appropriate, because there is evidence of serial 
correlation (both from Wooldridge’s (2002) test (F(1,10) 35.64; Prob.>F=0.00) and Arellano-
Bond’s (1991) test (z=8.03; Prob.>z=0.00) for autocorrelation), most likely due to the presence of 
social contagion, and heteroskedasticity (using a modified Wald statistic for groupwise 
heteroskedasticity following Greene (2003) ( 2(11) =846.09; Prob.> 2=0.00)) in the error term.  
Therefore, we use a Prais-Winsten model with panel-corrected standard errors to estimate 
equation (1) for all video game consoles jointly (Baltagi and Li 1991). We assume panel-level 
heteroskedastic errors, and a panel-specific AR(1) autocorrelation, thus capturing the social 
network exposure (i.e., social contagion) (e.g., Hedstrom 1994; Strang 1991; Van den Bulte and 
Lilien 2001; Van den Bulte and Stremersch 2004). This procedure is also appropriate with 
unbalanced panel data sets such as ours. The required diagnostic tests for descriptive models 
(Franses 2005) did not reveal any need to revise the model.  
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Results 
We first discuss how superstar software introductions affect hardware unit sales, 
controlling for the other variables we discussed earlier. Then, we discuss our findings on the 
moderating role of software type on the effect of superstar software introductions on hardware 
unit sales. 
The Effect of Superstars 
We present the results of estimating equation (1) in Table 4, model 1. The adjusted R2 
shows that the model fits the data very well, which is not surprising, given that it also includes 
software introductions, the December holiday effect, and a time trend (through hardware age). 
We next discuss the model’s parameter estimates. 
All parameters have the expected sign and are highly significant, except for software price 
and software catalog, which are not significant. The introduction of a superstar has a significant 
and positive effect for the first 5 months, in the month of introduction (β50 = 0.058, p < 0.01), and 
1 (β51 = 0.081, p < 0.01), 2 (β52 = 0.077, p < 0.01), 3 (β53 = 0.064, p < 0.01), and 4 months after 
introduction (β54 = 0.040, p < 0.05). The 5th  lag (e.g., t+5), and all later lags are not significant.6 
We can also reject that the cumulative superstar effect at t+5 is equal to zero (β50 + β51 + β52 + β53 
+ β54 + β55 = 0), at the p < 0.01 level.   
Using these parameters, we estimate both the monthly effects and the cumulative effect of 
superstar introductions on hardware unit sales, from their introduction at t, until 5 months after 
their introduction (t+5). Figure 5 depicts this graphically. The monthly effect peaks during 1 to 2 
months after introduction, and decays afterwards. Remember that software unit sales flatten 
around the same time. A superstar software title increases hardware unit sales by 14% (167,000 
                                                 
6 We start with a large number of superstar lags (e.g., a large ) as suggested by Greene (2003), and reduce the 
number of lags until only the last lag (e.g., t+5) is not significant. By including the last not significant lag, we make 
sure that the coefficients are not biased and inconsistent because of this (Greene 2003; Judge et al. 1985).  
N
 20
units) on average, during these first 6 months7 (29,000 units during the month of introduction (t), 
39,000 (t+1), 38,000 (t+2), 32,000 (t+3), 21,000 (t+4) and 8,000 (t+5)). We report both the 
percentage increase in hardware unit sales, and the size of this effect in hardware unit sales, of a 
superstar software introduction. This allows us to compare the hardware effect, with the software 
effect, of superstars. However, we advise caution when interpreting these hardware unit effects, 
due to the large variance between and within systems. A superstar achieves software sales of 
835,000 units on average, during these first 6 months (see Figure 2). Meaning that during these 
first 6 months, on average, 1 in every 5 buyers of a superstar software title, also purchases the 
hardware required to use the superstar software title.  
We also find that software introductions (β3 = 0.274, p < 0.01) and software quality (β4 = 
0.013, p < 0.05) are significant.  Hardware price (α1 = -1.073, p < 0.01) has a significant and 
negative effect on hardware unit sales, while the system becomes less popular as it ages (α2 = -
0.008, p < 0.01) (i.e., a negative time trend)8. The effect of the software catalog (β2 = -0.019) is 
not significant, because consumers do not seem to value old non-superstar software titles. Also 
the effect of software price (β1 = 0.345) is not significant. Reasons for the latter may be that there 
is little variance in software price or that software price shows a high correlation with hardware 
age and software catalog, potentially inflating the standard error. We also find that there is a 
bump in hardware unit sales in December (γ1 = 0.550, p < 0.01), due to the holiday effect.  
We can re-estimate Model 1, using different software quality thresholds to identify 
superstars, in order to examine the relationship between the choice of the threshold and 
superstars’ cumulative effect on hardware unit sales. The number of superstars drops sharply with 
an increasing quality threshold. Consistent with the superstar theory formulated by Rosen (1981), 
                                                 
7 Using only expert ratings or only user ratings, instead of the average of both, to identify superstar software titles, 
also confirms the presence of a superstar effect, while all other estimated parameters were highly similar. 
8 Using trends that are even more flexible such as t2 + t, or t2 + t + log t, to estimate equation (1) gave similar results. 
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we again find a monotonic increasing returns relationship between software quality and hardware 
unit sales (See Figure 6), similar to the one between software quality and software unit sales. A 
software quality threshold of 86 – all games with a quality rating of 86 and above are considered 
superstars – identifies 337 software titles as a superstar. Software titles with a quality rating of 86 
and above increase hardware unit sales with only 4% (48,000 units) on average during the first 6 
months. A quality threshold of 92 – all games with a quality rating of 92 and above are 
considered superstars – identifies just 32 software titles as a superstar. Software titles with a 
quality rating of 92 and above increase hardware unit sales with 26% (285,000 units) on average 
during the first 6 months (See Figure 6).  
We subsequently examine if this apparent monotonic increasing returns relationship, 
between software quality and hardware unit sales is significant, by dividing the 89 identified 
superstar software titles into 3 evenly sized groups, according to their software quality rating. The 
lowest quality superstars (N=30) are grouped together, and have an average software quality 
rating of 90.48. The medium quality superstars (N=30) are grouped together, and have an average 
software quality rating of 91.45. The highest quality superstars (N=29) are grouped together, and 
have an average software quality of 93.25. Model 2 in Table 4 shows the estimated parameters of 
the 3 superstar quality groups. Using these parameters, we can again estimate the monthly and 
cumulative effects of these 3 superstar quality groups on hardware unit sales, using a similar 
methodology as before. 
The highest quality superstars increase hardware unit sales with 21% (242,000 units), the 
medium quality superstars increase hardware unit sales with 13% (160,000 units), while the 
lowest quality superstars increase hardware unit sales with only 8% (101,000 units).9 We can 
                                                 
9 Estimating the cumulative superstar effects presented in this section, using only the first 4 or 5 months, confirm the 
findings presented here. 
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reject that the cumulative superstar effect of the low, medium and high quality groups are equal 
to zero. We can also reject that the cumulative effect of the lowest quality superstars is equal to 
the cumulative effect of the highest quality superstars. We cannot reject that the cumulative effect 
of the medium quality superstar group differs from the other two effects. All these results support 
our theoretical rationale that superstars display increasing returns of software quality to hardware 
unit sales, as the returns to quality increase over quality tiers (low – medium – high). 
The Effect of Software Type 
Models 3, 4 and 5, in Table 5, show the effect of superstar introductions on hardware unit 
sales moderated by software type. We first distinguish between superstars that are exclusively 
available for just one system (n=56), and non-exclusive superstars that are available for multiple 
systems (n=33). Model 3 in Table 5 shows the estimated parameters of the exclusive superstar 
and non-exclusive superstar effects. Using these parameters, we can again estimate the monthly 
and cumulative effects of exclusive and non-exclusive superstars on hardware unit sales, using a 
similar methodology as before.  
Exclusive superstars increase hardware unit sales with 16% (196,000 units), while non-
exclusive superstars increase hardware unit sales with only 9% (117,000 units). We can reject 
that both the cumulative exclusive superstar effect and the cumulative non-exclusive superstar 
effect are equal to zero. However, we cannot reject that these two cumulative effects are 
statistically equal to one another, due to the large standard errors and numerous non-significant 
parameter estimates. We can therefore not confirm the theoretical rationale, that exclusive 
superstars have a larger effect on hardware unit sales compared to non-exclusive superstars.  
Next, we distinguish between superstars that are original titles (n=49) from superstars that 
are sequels (n=40). Model 4 in Table 5 shows the estimated parameters of the original superstar 
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and superstar sequel effects. Original superstars increase hardware unit sales by 12% (146,000 
units), while superstar sequels increase hardware unit sales by 16% (192,000 units). We can 
reject that both the cumulative original superstar effect and the cumulative superstar sequel effect 
is equal to zero. However, we cannot reject that these two cumulative effects are statistically 
equal to one another. We can therefore not confirm any of the two theoretical rationales. 
Last, we distinguish superstars according to their genre. As stated before, there are 6 
genres. The two large genres are action (n=36) and platformer (n=12). The four small genres are 
first-person shooter (FPS) (n=7), racing (n=5), role-playing (RPG) (n=20), and sports (n=9). 
Model 5 in Table 5 shows the parameters of the superstar effects per genre. The small size of 
some genres is likely a contributing factor to a number of insignificant parameters. First-person 
shooter (FPS) (25% (280,000 units)) and racing (26% (286,000 units)) superstars have the largest 
(i.e., above average) impact on hardware unit sales. Superstars from the genres role-playing 
(RPG) (14% (170,000 units)) and sports (16% (190,000 units)) have a moderate effect on 
hardware unit sales. Surprisingly, superstars from the two large genres (action 10% (129,000 
units) and platformer 11% (142,000 units)) have the smallest (i.e., below average) effect on 
hardware unit sales. We can reject that the cumulative effect, from each software genre is equal 
to zero. However, we cannot reject that these cumulative effects are statistically equal to one 
another. We can therefore not confirm the theoretical rationale that superstars from a larger genre 
have a larger effect on hardware unit sales.  
We are unable to confirm that software type moderates the effect superstars have on 
hardware unit sales. However, this may be different in other system markets. Take for instance, 
the High Definition DVD market. Superstar movies will likely stimulate sales of High Definition 
DVD players; much like titles such as The Matrix did for the DVD format. At the same time, 
different movie types exist, which may generate different returns. For instance, action movies full 
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of computer-generated images (CGI) are likely to have a larger impact on hardware unit sales, as 
compared to drama movies, which depend less on the high screen resolution and the large 
number of sound channels, therefore being less suitable to sell High-Definition DVD players. 
Robustness and Further Analyses 
Our estimations of various models show stability in parameter estimates. We conducted 
the following analyses to further test the robustness of our estimates.  
We used different estimation methods (than our Prais-Winsten model) such as OLS and 
GMM, and different sub-samples, to estimate equation (1). All these analyses confirm our 
findings reported above. We also estimated a model that included competition, through 
contemporaneous (0.509, p < 0.01) and lagged competitor hardware unit sales (-0.076, p < 0.01). 
This model again yielded similar findings. Finally, we also estimated a model lagging 
independent variables, which again confirmed our findings. In sum, our findings are highly 
robust to alternate model specifications.   
One could also study the effect of the accumulation of superstar introductions over time 
for a certain system (i.e., the superstar catalog size), on hardware unit sales. We have done so, 
and found the effect of the accumulation of superstars on hardware unit sales to be positive 
(0.017, p<0.01), while all other estimated parameters were similar.  
The correlation matrix in Table 3 shows high correlations between several independent 
variables (i.e., hardware age, hardware price, software quantity and software price). We assessed 
the consequences of these high correlations in two ways.  First, we used multiple procedures to 
assess multicollinearity (e.g., Belsley 1991; Belsley, Kuh and Welsh 1980; Marquardt 1970). All 
these procedures indicate that the weak to moderate dependencies between the independent 
variables do not create harmful multicollinearity. The values of the condition indices are below 
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35, and variance inflation factors are below 5. In addition, the correlation between the different 
superstar types and their lags is low (i.e., below 0.25). Second, we dropped independent variables 
that showed a high correlation with another independent variable, one by one. The parameter 
estimates we obtained are very similar to the model that included the dropped independent 
variable, parameter estimates do not fluctuate dramatically, and parameter estimates do not 
change sign. Overall, we can conclude that our results are highly robust. 
Discussion 
We find that superstars are as attractive as popular belief suggests, and helped to sell over 
14.8 million systems, which is around 12.4% of total hardware unit sales. During the first 6 
months a superstar software title is on the market, 1 in every 5 buyers of a superstar software 
title, also purchases the hardware required to use the superstar software title. Systems with no or 
only one superstar failed miserably. Surprisingly, while superstar software unit sales peak during 
introduction and decline with each month, the monthly superstar effect on hardware unit sales 
peaks in the second to third month, and thus displays an inverted U-shape effect over time. Thus, 
high software unit sales of superstars do not automatically translate into a large, or similarly 
shaped, superstar effect on hardware unit sales. This different time pattern is likely because of the 
relative slower diffusion of information about superstars among non-adopters (i.e., potential 
hardware buyers), compared to adopters (i.e., software buyers). Software type, such as the 
exclusivity of a superstar, does not significantly moderate the effect of superstar software releases 
on video game console sales.  
Implications 
These findings have important implications for theory and research on system markets, as 
they invalidate prior operationalizations of software availability. Using the software catalog as an 
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indicator for software availability, which is standard practice in network effects literature, may 
show insignificant indirect network effects (Stremersch et al. 2007). Using the number of 
software titles introduced may paint an incomplete picture, as it does not account for increasing 
returns to quality and thus the abnormal returns on superstars. Future research should use a 
software availability measure, which accounts for both software titles of varying superstar power, 
and varying durability (given the decay in effects over time we found with respect to superstars, 
and the non-significant effect of the old software catalog on hardware unit sales).  
We find a monotonic increasing returns relationship, between software quality and 
software unit sales (See Figure 1), and between superstar quality and hardware unit sales (See 
Figure 6). Thereby, we contribute to the literature on quality by extending the relevance and 
importance of product quality in the product’s own market (i.e., the superstar effect in the 
software market) to complementary and adjoining markets (i.e., the hardware market). 
Software firms should examine their inventory of software titles for potential superstars, 
and negotiate with system owners to receive side-payments for the increase in hardware unit sales 
their superstars cause. Software firms could even initiate a bidding war between system owners 
for the rights to their superstars. System owners should examine the forthcoming software titles 
for potential superstar power. If a software franchise (e.g., Take-Two’s Grand Theft Auto 
Franchise) is famous for creating superstar software titles, system owners should proactively act 
on this knowledge.10  Microsoft paid $50 million to software publisher Take-Two, for producing 
two downloadable episodes of Grand-Theft Auto (Schiesel 2007). As superstars only have a 
positive effect on hardware unit sales for a limited period, system owners must convince 
consumers that the introduction of a superstar is not a fluke, but that there will be a steady supply 
of superstar software titles. System owners should inform consumers early on during the software 
                                                 
10 We thank a reviewer for this insight. 
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development process, that software developers of past superstars are developing new superstars, 
to manage expectations and in order to create positive expectations, which are so crucial in 
positive feedback markets (e.g., Shapiro and Varian 1998).  
However, system owners must remember that when they pay software firms for the 
exclusivity of their superstars, they are not additionally increasing their own hardware sales -
compared to a non-exclusive superstar software title - but that they are eliminating an opportunity 
for competing systems to increase their hardware unit sales. Eliminating competitor hardware 
sales while increasing one’s own hardware sales, may well be the deciding factor in a positive 
feedback market (e.g., Arthur 1989 and 1996; Shapiro and Varian 1998). The Sega Dreamcast 
had plenty of superstars during its first year, and subsequently hardware sales exceeded 
expectations. However, when the introduction of superstars dried up during the second year, due 
to software publishers switching to the Sony Playstation 2, so did hardware sales, and Sega was 
forced to withdraw from the market, as a system’s owner.  
Superstars display increasing returns (both in software unit sales and hardware unit sales) 
to software quality. Cutting corners, while rushing a software title to market, to meet a deadline 
(e.g., the launch of the hardware, or the December holidays), will not only have an adverse effect 
on the software sales of the software title itself. It could also turn a potential superstar into a ‘me-
too’ software title, without a superstar effect on hardware sales, just because of the slightly lower 
software quality. System owners should intervene, and pay software publishers to continue 
development, in order to improve quality. In addition, system owners should provide resources 
(e.g., popular franchises, more advanced game engines, etc.), if a software publisher does not 
have the resources to turn a ‘me-too’ software title into a superstar, because it will increase both 
software and hardware sales.  
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While our empirical test reflected upon the role of superstar introductions in system 
markets, in only one system market, namely the U.S. home video game console market, its 
conceptual conclusions – numbers may vary – are likely to be valid in other markets as well. In 
the High-Definition DVD market, the absence or presence of support from movie studios who 
have introduced recent superstar movies proved to be the deciding factor in the standards war 
between Toshiba’s HD-DVD standard and Sony’s Blu-ray standard, that tipped the market 
towards Sony’s Blu-ray standard. In addition, the Satellite radio market in the U.S. is likely to be 
also such a superstar system market, in which multiple incompatible systems fought one another 
for dominance (Sirius and XM). The signing of superstars like Howard Stern, and the exclusive 
rights to live broadcasts of NFL games, are important events that likely increased sales of one of 
the two competing systems. In contrast, the lack of superstars (i.e., NFL games, superstar movies) 
in the HDTV market may well be the cause of the initial sluggish adoption of HDTV sets. 
Therefore, both hardware and software firms should carefully examine the role superstars play in 
their industry, as superstars affect both software and hardware sales. 
Limitations and Future Research 
The present paper is the first one to study the role of superstar software titles in system 
markets. Thus, this paper is an important contribution to the literature that may provoke further 
research. At the same time, it also has some limitations that such future research may address.  
This paper only examines one system market. Future research could examine if the 
superstar phenomenon also exists outside the video game market, and if the effect superstars have 
on hardware unit sales is similar to that of superstars in the video game industry. Markets that 
may prove fruitful to examine are the High-Definition DVD market and the Satellite radio 
market.  
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This paper also only focuses on the hardware adoption side, and largely ignores the 
software provision side, as this is not the focus of the paper. While this is a common approach in 
modeling system markets (e.g. Hartman and Teece 1990; Shankar and Bayus 2003), it does raise 
potential endogeneity concerns. However, in our case, these concerns cannot be addressed by 
specifying both a demand and supply model (as in, Nair, Chintagunta and Dubé 2004; Sawhney 
and Eliashberg 1996). The reason is that important data in the supply equation is unavailable (e.g. 
software costs) and possible instruments (e.g. from a different geographic area) again are 
unavailable.  
On the positive side, we have several indications that endogeneity is not a major concern 
in our case. First, prior studies on system markets that explicitly address potential endogeneity 
show the findings from a model that controls for endogeneity to be very similar to the findings 
from a model that does not (e.g. Dranove and Gandal 2003; Gandal, Kende and Rob 2000; Le-
Nagard-Assayag and Manceau 2001; Ohashi 2003; Park 2004; Rysman 2004). Second, it is 
unlikely that the variables of focal interest to us, such as superstar introductions, software 
quantity, and software quality, depend upon contemporaneous hardware unit sales. The reason is 
that it takes 12 to 18 months to develop an average video game. Superstars can take many years 
to develop. Thus, while price may be endogenous, potentially creating a bias in our price 
parameters, this is very unlikely to occur in the software availability variables. Third, one way to 
reduce endogeneity is to lag all independent variables. We found that this did not affect our 
estimates much, again alleviating endogeneity concerns. 
In addition, we do not study the technological characteristics of the hardware. We control 
for this effect in our model by including a fixed effect. However, the study of such technological 
characteristics may yield interesting managerial insights, as they seem to have become more 
important recently (e.g. What is the effect of Nintendo’s unique game controller on hardware unit 
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sales? What is the effect of the Blu-ray capability of the Sony Playstation 3 on hardware unit 
sales?).  
Our research may also stimulate further research in this area, which does not necessarily 
focus on addressing shortcomings of the present study. First, the present study focuses on the 
sales gain from superstar introductions. Obviously, superstars may require a higher investment 
and are intrinsically more risky to develop. A study that examines the profitability of investments 
made by system owners in the supply of superstars would be intrinsically interesting, but 
challenging to conduct.  
We have also shown that superstar introductions are an important indicator of hardware 
unit sales. Thus, the supply of superstars may be critical input in determining who will win 
system wars (e.g. the current battle between Microsoft’s Xbox 360, Nintendo’s Wii and Sony’s 
Playstation 3). However, our study lacks foresight, in the sense that it studies actual 
introductions, rather than announcements. It would be highly valuable to study the effect of 
superstar announcements on hardware unit sales (foresight by consumers) or firm valuations 
(foresight by investors). The support of third parties (i.e., independent software publishers) for a 
certain system may also be very valuable information in this regard. Our approach also lacks 
foresight in the operationalization of superstars. We determine ex post which software titles are 
superstars, given their perceived quality. Studies that would enable us to determine which 
software titles have superstar potential prior to their introduction would be most valuable. 
In addition, examining the role of horizontal concentration in the software and hardware 
market, as well as vertical integration between the software and hardware market, or examining 
the role side-payments play in system markets, will likely also be fruitful areas of future research. 
We hope that these research ideas spark more interest in the phenomenon of superstars in 
system markets, which has remained deprived from academic attention for too long.
Table 1: 
The Video Game Consoles We Study 
System Start & End Number of Months 
3DO Multiplayer Sep-93 to Sep-96 37 
Atari Jaguar Nov-93 to Dec-95 26 
Microsoft Xbox Nov-01 to Dec-04 38 
Nintendo 64 Sep-96 to Nov-01 63 
Nintendo GameCube Nov-01 to Dec-04 38 
Nintendo Super NES Jan-93 to Jan-96 37 
Sega Dreamcast Sep-99 to Dec-01 28 
Sega Genesis Jan-93 to Dec-96 48 
Sega Saturn May-95 to Mar-98 35 
Sony Playstation Sep-95 to Dec-04 112 
Sony Playstation 2 Oct-00 to Dec-04 51 
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Table 2:  
The Superstars We Identify in the Video Game Industry 
 
Sega Genesis 
 
     Earthworm Jim 
     Lunar: Eternal Blue 
     Snatcher   
 
Nintendo Super NES 
 
     Xenogears 
     Chrono Trigger  
     Donkey Kong Country  
     Donkey Kong Country 2: Diddy's Que  
     Final Fantasy 3 
     Secret of Mana 
     Super Mario All Stars 
     Super Mario RPG: Legend of the Seven Stars 
     Super Mario World 2: Yoshi's Island 
     Super Metroid  
 
Atari Jaguar 
 
     Tempest 2000 
      
Sony Playstation 
 
     Castlevania: Symphony of the Night 
     Chrono Cross 
     Final Fantasy 7  
     Final Fantasy 9 
     Gran Turismo 
     Metal Gear Solid 
     Resident Evil 2 
     Tekken 3 
     Tony Hawk's Pro Skater 
     Tony Hawk's Pro Skater 2 
 
Nintendo 64 
 
     Conker's Bad Fur Day 
     James Bond 007: Goldeneye 007 
     Legend of Zelda: Majora's Mask 
     Legend of Zelda: Ocarina of Time 
     Perfect Dark 
     Super Mario 64 
 
Sega Dreamcast 
 
     NBA 2K1 
     NFL 2K 
     NFL 2K1 
     Resident Evil Code: Veronica X 
     Skies of Arcadia 
     Soul Calibur 
     Tony Hawk's Pro Skater 
     Tony Hawk's Pro Skater 2 
     Virtua Tennis 
 
 
Sony Playstation 2 
 
     Burnout 3: Takedown  
     Devil May Cry 
     Final Fantasy 10 X 
     Gran Turismo 3 A-Spec 
     Grand Theft Auto 3 
     Grand Theft Auto: Andreas 
     Grand Theft Auto: Vice City 
     Madden NFL 2004  
     Metal Gear Solid 2: Sons Of Liberty 
     Metal Gear Solid 3: Snake Eat  
     NBA Street Vol. 2 
     NCAA Football 2003 
     NCAA Football 2004 
     Prince of Persia: The Sands of Time 
     Ratchet & Clank: Going  
     Ratchet & Clank: Up  
     Soul Calibur 2 
     SSX 2 Tricky 
     SSX 3  
     Tiger Woods PGA Tour 2004 
     Timesplitters 2 
     Tony Hawk's Pro Skater 3 
     Tony Hawk's Pro Skater 4 
     Tony Hawk's Underground 
     Virtua Fighter 4: Evo  
     Winning Eleven 6 World Soccer 
     Winning Eleven 7 International 
 
Nintendo GameCube 
 
     Eternal Darkness: Sanity's Requiem 
     Legend of Zelda: The Wind Waker 
     Madden NFL 2004  
     Metroid Prime 
     Metroid Prime 2: Echo  
     Paper Mario: Thousand  
     Pikmin 2 
     Prince of Persia: The Sands of Time 
     Soul Calibur 2 
     SSX 3  
     Super Smash Brothers 2 Melee 
     Viewtiful Joe  
 
Microsoft Xbox 
 
     Burnout 3: Takedown  
     Grand Theft Auto (3 & Vice City)  
     Halo 1: Combat Evolved 
     Halo 2 
     NCAA Football 2004 
     Ninja Gaiden 
     Prince of Persia: The Sands of Time 
     Project Gotham 2 
     Star Wars: Knights Republic 
     Tom Clancy's Splinter Cell 
     Tom Clancy's Splinter Cell: Pandora Tomorrow 
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Table 3:  
The Descriptive Statistics of the Relevant Variables 
 Correlation 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Hardware Unit Sales          
2 Hardware Price -0.09 
3 Hardware Age -0.02 -0.63 
4 Software Catalog 0.17 -0.55 0.80 
5 Software Quality 0.17 -0.25 -0.14 -0.05 
6 Software Price -0.06 0.52 -0.68 -0.76 -0.05 
7 Software Introductions 0.40 -0.06 -0.03 0.23 0.09 -0.11 
8 December Holidays Effect 0.58 0.02 -0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.04 
9 Introduction Superstar 0.17 -0.01 -0.07 0.08 0.20 -0.09 0.39 -0.04 
          
Mean 223,121 164.89 35.12 308.86 67.07 34.37 9.93 0.09 0.13 
Standard Deviation 328,757 102.00 26.82 255.70 4.26 13.23 9.71 0.29 0.34 
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Table 4:  
Superstar Introductions Affect Hardware Unit Sales  
And Display Increasing Returns 
Variables                Model 1              Variables Model 2 
  Coefficient (S.E.)  Coefficient (S.E.) 
1α  Hardware Price -1.073** (0.195) Hardware Price -1.109** (0.192) 
2α  Hardware Age -0.008** (0.002) Hardware Age -0.008** (0.002) 
1β  Software Price  0.345 (0.261) Software Price  0.265 (0.262) 
2β  Software Catalog -0.019 (0.064) Software Catalog -0.021 (0.064) 
3β  Software Introductions  0.274** (0.025) Software Introductions  0.265** (0.025) 
4β  Software Quality  0.013* (0.006) Software Quality  0.013* (0.006) 
50β  Superstar  0.058** (0.016) Lowest Quality Superstar  -0.009 (0.025) 
51β  Superstar L1  0.081** (0.017) Lowest Quality Superstar L1  0.074** (0.028) 
52β  Superstar L2  0.077** (0.017) Lowest Quality Superstar L2  0.049 (0.030) 
53β  Superstar L3  0.064** (0.017) Lowest Quality Superstar L3  0.058 (0.031) 
54β  Superstar L4  0.040* (0.017) Lowest Quality Superstar L4  0.049 (0.032) 
55β  Superstar L5  0.015 (0.016) Lowest Quality Superstar L5  0.003 (0.028) 
    Medium Quality Superstar   0.098** (0.030) 
    Medium Quality Superstar L1  0.083* (0.033) 
    Medium Quality Superstar L2  0.090** (0.033) 
    Medium Quality Superstar L3  0.056 (0.031) 
    Medium Quality Superstar L4  0.004 (0.030) 
    Medium Quality Superstar L5  0.033 (0.029) 
    Highest Quality Superstar   0.123** (0.028) 
    Highest Quality Superstar L1  0.097** (0.031) 
    Highest Quality Superstar L2  0.131** (0.033) 
    Highest Quality Superstar L3  0.092** (0.035) 
    Highest Quality Superstar L4  0.093** (0.036) 
    Highest Quality Superstar L5  0.028 (0.033) 
1γ  December 0.550** (0.023) December  0.550** (0.023) 
       
Adj-R2                 0.98  0.98 
Number of observations                 503  503 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Two-sided significance tests: **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05. 
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Table 5:  
The Effect of Superstar Introductions by Software Type 
 
Variables Model 3   Variables Model 4     Variables Model 5 
  Coefficient (S.E.)     Coefficient (S.E.)   Coefficient (S.E.) 
Hardware Price -1.076** (0.197)  Hardware Price -1.070** (0.196)  Hardware Price -1.065** (0.199) 
Hardware Age -0.009** (0.002)  Hardware Age -0.008** (0.002)  Hardware Age -0.008** (0.002) 
Software Price  0.320 (0.263)  Software Price  0.357 (0.262)  Software Price  0.400 (0.273) 
Software Catalog -0.014 (0.064)  Software Catalog -0.016 (0.063)  Software Catalog -0.015 (0.066) 
Software Introductions  0.266** (0.025)  Software Introductions  0.274** (0.025)  Software Introductions  0.277** (0.026) 
Software Quality  0.013* (0.013)  Software Quality   0.013* (0.006)  Software Quality  0.012* (0.006) 
Exclusive Superstar  0.096** (0.023)  Original Superstar  0.066** (0.024)  Action Superstar -0.007 (0.026) 
Exclusive Superstar L1  0.081** (0.025)  Original Superstar L1  0.076** (0.025)  Action Superstar L1  0.077** (0.029) 
Exclusive Superstar L2  0.085** (0.026)  Original Superstar L2  0.059* (0.025)  Action Superstar L2  0.050 (0.027) 
Exclusive Superstar L3  0.081** (0.027)  Original Superstar L3  0.065* (0.026)  Action Superstar L3  0.047 (0.027) 
Exclusive Superstar L4  0.056* (0.028)  Original Superstar L4  0.015 (0.026)  Action Superstar L4  0.038 (0.026) 
Exclusive Superstar L5  0.029 (0.025)  Original Superstar L5 -0.003 (0.024)  Action Superstar L5  0.038 (0.026) 
Non-excl. Superstar  0.006 (0.024)  Superstar Sequel  0.045 (0.024)  FPS Superstar  0.223** (0.056) 
Non-excl. Superstar L1  0.090** (0.024)  Superstar Sequel L1  0.080** (0.025)  FPS Superstar L1  0.127* (0.059) 
Non-excl. Superstar L2  0.076** (0.025)  Superstar Sequel L2  0.093** (0.026)  FPS Superstar L2  0.127 (0.067) 
Non-excl. Superstar L3  0.057* (0.025)  Superstar Sequel L3  0.059* (0.027)  FPS Superstar L3  0.130* (0.066) 
Non-excl. Superstar L4  0.028 (0.025)  Superstar Sequel L4  0.073** (0.028)  FPS Superstar L4  0.003 (0.065) 
Non-excl. Superstar L5 -0.004 (0.024)  Superstar Sequel L5  0.027 (0.026)  FPS Superstar L5 -0.073 (0.063) 
        Platformer Superstar  0.102** (0.044) 
       Platformer Superstar L1  0.127** (0.049) 
       Platformer Superstar L2  0.044 (0.047) 
       Platformer Superstar L3  0.085 (0.044) 
       Platformer Superstar L4 -0.044 (0.045) 
       Platformer Superstar L5 -0.015 (0.040) 
       Racing Superstar  0.046 (0.063) 
       Racing Superstar L1  0.095 (0.071) 
       Racing Superstar L2  0.163* (0.075) 
       Racing Superstar L3  0.087 (0.075) 
       Racing Superstar L4  0.228* (0.098) 
       Racing Superstar L5  0.125 (0.091) 
       RPG Superstar  0.045 (0.038) 
       RPG Superstar L1  0.074 (0.042) 
       RPG Superstar L2  0.091* (0.044) 
       RPG Superstar L3  0.076 (0.045) 
       RPG Superstar L4  0.038 (0.044) 
       RPG Superstar L5  0.011 (0.039) 
       Sports Superstar  0.146* (0.059) 
       Sports Superstar L1  0.004 (0.062) 
       Sports Superstar L2  0.094 (0.066) 
       Sports Superstar L3  0.028 (0.070) 
       Sports Superstar L4  0.051 (0.074) 
       Sports Superstar L5  0.060 (0.068) 
December  0.549** (0.023)  December  0.548** (0.023)  December  0.550** (0.024) 
           
Adj-R2 0.98   0.98    0.97 
Number of observations 503     503     503 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Two-sided significance tests: **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05. 
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Figure 1:  
The Video Game Industry is a Superstar Industry 
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Figure 2:  
Software Unit Sales of Superstar and  
Non-superstar Software Titles  
 
 
 
 (Source: NPD)
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 Figure 3:  
Hardware and Software Sales of Consoles and PC’s 
 
 
 (Source: CEA, NPD) 
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Figure 4:  
Video game and PC game sales according to Game Genre* 
  
* Information on PC Genres is only available from 2004. 
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 Figure 5:  
The Effect of Superstars on Hardware Unit Sales over Time  
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 Figure 6:  
Varying the Software Quality Threshold to Identify Superstars 
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